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While international relations scholars make many claims about violence, they rarely define the concept. This article develops
a typology of three distinct kinds of violence: direct, indirect, and pacification. Direct violence occurs when a person or agent
inflicts harm on another. Indirect violence manifests through the structures of society. We propose a third understanding
of violence: pacification. Using a phenomenological methodology, and drawing on anarchist and postcolonial thought, we
show that the violence of pacification is diffuse, inconspicuous, intersubjective, and structured into the fabric of society. This
understanding of violence matters for the study of international relations in general and research on the liberal peace in
particular. We argue that the spread of liberal institutions does not necessarily decrease violence but instead transforms it.
Our phenomenological analysis captures empirical trends in human domination and suffering that liberal peace theories
cannot account for. It reveals how a decline in direct violence may coincide with the transformation of violence in ways that
are concealed, monopolized, and structured into the liberal order. We call this process liberal pacification.
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“They plunder, they slaughter, and they steal: this they
falsely name Empire, and where they make a waste-
land, they call it peace.”
—Tacitus, Agricola, chap. XXX (1914)
Introduction
Canonical texts in international relations define peace as
the absence of violence (Aron 1973, 21; Bull 2012, 18;
Clausewitz 1976, 75; Waltz 1959, 1; 1979, 343). However, a
glance at the philology of the word “peace” reveals a more
complex relationship with violence. The Latin words for
peace (pax, pacis, paco) trace their roots to the verb for a
pact (pacisci), “which ended a war and led to submission,
friendship, or alliance.” As Rome transitioned from repub-
lic to empire, pax changed its meaning from a pact among
equals to submission to Rome, and “pacare began to refer to
conquest” (Weinstock 1960, 45).1
Two monuments built by Augustus, the first Roman Em-
peror, record this shift in the meaning of peace. The first,
the Ara Pacis Augustae, a monument to the goddess of peace,
mond Duvall, Christian Enemark, Piki Ish-Shalom, and Ole Wæver for comments
on earlier drafts of this article. Esmyr van Hees read the entire article three times
to offer guidance on the style and clarity of the writing. An early version of this
article was presented at the 2018 meeting of the International Studies Association.
1Pacare is a conjugation of paco, the Latin verb meaning to pacify or subdue.
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commemorates Augustus’s pacification of Gaul and Spain
(Kleiner 2005, 212). The second, the funerary inscription
Res Gestae Divi Augusti, appeared on Augustus’s tomb and
celebrates his many accomplishments, including bringing
peace to the sea, Gaul, Spain, and the Alps. Crucially, the
term used to characterize this peace is pacavi, which means
pacified. Pacavi is not the absence of violence but the use of
violence to reorder the world into a Roman Empire. Thus,
Pax Romana meant eliminating the threat of war—both civil
and foreign—through the preponderance of Roman mili-
tary might.
Romans understood peace to include both the absence
of violence and the forceful creation and maintenance
of a political order: pacification. Modern scholars in the
field, however, understand violence and peace as antonyms.
While some researchers question the meaning of peace
(Martín 2005; Richmond 2008), the field almost never
scrutinizes its concepts of violence.2 In fact, scholars of
international relations seldom even use the term (Thomas
2011, 1815–16).
Inspired by this anamnesis analysis of pax, we argue that
violence functions as a structural feature of the world—even
a seemingly peaceful world.3 Violence is not the absence of
peace but, rather, as the Romans recognized, the ordering
feature of the pax. Violence constitutes modern society. We
argue for a phenomenological understanding of violence
to reframe how we might theorize what violence is. Our
approach does not contest the basic character of violence
(harm, death, and so forth.). Rather, it identifies violence as
a structuring feature of the world, one that conditions and
enables political, social, and economic relations. We define
this process as pacification: the process of rendering invisi-
ble what scholars in the field identify as direct and indirect
violence.
This article proceeds in four parts. In part one, we iden-
tify a conceptual gap at the heart of much international
relations scholarship about violence. We show that schol-
ars generally conceptualize violence as either direct (the
consequence of empirically identifiable behaviors) or indi-
rect (behaviors that in the aggregate cause violence via the
institutions of modern society). Across mainstream and crit-
ical literatures alike, scholars understand violence as a spe-
cific thing, the effects of which we can observe, count, mea-
sure, and potentially eliminate. In part two, we introduce
a phenomenological methodology for theorizing violence.
We show how violence operates even when it is unobserv-
able. Observable violence can function as a rupture that re-
veals the hidden violence of pacification. In part three, we
develop our account of violence as pacification, which we
argue is central to the development of the liberal world or-
der. Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal cap-
italism. Postcolonial thought reveals the pacification in colo-
nialism. In part four, we demonstrate the theoretical value of
our tripartite classification of violence: direct, indirect, and
pacification. Our understanding of pacification as violence
allows us to account for both the empirical observation of
the liberal peace as leading to a decline in direct violence
and the claim that the Pax Americana represents an increase
in violence overall.
2An exception is Frazer and Hutchings (2007) who have sought to ex-
pand theoretical understandings of the concept. See also Calkivik (2016) and
Rodriguez-Alcázar (2017).
3Anamnesis is “a critique based on the forgetting of past heritage” (Baron
2018, 30; compare Havercroft 2011, 24–28).
Conventional and Critical Understandings of Violence
in International Relations
Both mainstream and critical scholars of international re-
lations understand violence as something done by an in-
dividual or a group to other individuals or groups. Vio-
lence is a tool or instrument deployed for particular pur-
poses, such as deterrence or compellence. Direct violence
occurs when one person or agent inflicts harm on another.
Researchers often measure direct violence using battlefield
deaths, homicide rates, or other forms of body counts.4 In-
direct violence is mediated through the structures of so-
ciety, such as poverty or famine, which produce higher
than average death rates. In both understandings, violence
involves a causal relationship between agents and targets
or victims. As a consequence, strict empiricist researchers
typically consider the effects of violence both visible and
measurable.
The democratic and liberal peace literatures, perhaps
the most prominent discussions of violence in international
relations, serve as a case in point. Liberal scholars argue
that the spread of liberal institutions—including democratic
governance, international trade, and human rights norms—
results in an overall decline of interstate violence (Doyle
1983; Rosecrance 1986; Mueller 1989; Oneal, Maoz, and
Russett 1996; Oneal and Russett 1999; Goldstein 2012).
Steven Pinker (2012) greatly expands the scope of this
claim. Not only does Pinker document declining warfare be-
tween nations, he also points to reductions in other forms of
violence, including homicide, terrorism, rape, child abuse,
capital punishment, and cruelty to animals. Pinker contends
that the decline of war and the success of the new liberal or-
der has relegated violence to isolated acts of terrorism and
local instances of civil and ethnic conflict. Most of this vio-
lence, he argues, takes place outside the writ of the liberal
world order.
Liberal theorists’ observations appear at odds with the vi-
olent turmoil of our time. Critical international relations
scholars contest liberal accounts of expanding peace, point-
ing to refugee crises, ecological devastation, financial col-
lapse, nuclear proliferation, drone warfare, widespread gov-
ernment repression, police violence, mass incarceration, a
grotesque concentration of wealth on a planetary scale, the
rise of the far right, and much more.5 Such critiques intro-
duce the concept of indirect violence to capture the ways
that institutions and structures inflict harm. Yet, as we will
show, neither of these understandings of violence—direct
or indirect—fully accounts for these pervasive experiences
and structures of violence.
Direct Violence
Direct violence is an instrument: “the use of physical force
to inflict injury or to cause damage to a person or prop-
erty” (Thomas 2011, 1817, 1828). This definition limits vio-
lence to observable instances and effects, usually killing and
4For example, Raleigh (2012). For a critique of how body counts are used to
support claims of the decline in war, see Fazal (2014).
5Liberal observers often portray postcolonial societies as lawless and beset by
criminal violence (see discussion in Comaroff and Comaroff 2006, 6). The cap-
italist world economy treats large swaths of humanity as “superfluous” and un-
needed (Mbembe 2017, 3; also, Mbembe 2001; Simone 2008). Liberal western
democracies, for all their wealth and resources, appear unable or unwilling to
adequately respond to humanitarian refugee crises in which 1 percent of the en-
tire human population is now displaced from their homes (Connor and Krogstad
2016). Oxfam (2017) reports that eight men now own the same wealth as the
poorest half of the world’s population.
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death. Liberal peace research rests on this definition. No-
tably, prominent quantitatively oriented scholars use battle-
field deaths as a proxy for violence to empirically test their
claims that the promotion of democracy, economic interde-
pendence, and international institutions have led to a de-
cline in violence.6
Few scholars scrutinize how liberal peace researchers
understand violence. Instead, academic debates about the
liberal peace focus on political issues and methodologi-
cal questions, including definitions of “war” and “peace.”
Some critics argue that “the scientific claim of peace among
democracies . . . is not value free” because liberal peace
scholars code regime types against a US-centric model of
democracy (Oren 1995, 266; Scoble and Wiseberg 1981;
Bollen 1993; Kegley and Hermann 1996; Lemke and Reed
1996). David Spiro and others interrogate how liberal peace
researchers include and exclude conflicts from their studies
through criteria such as conflict intensity and deaths tolls
(Ray 1993; Layne 1994; Spiro 1994; Raknerud and Hegre
1997; Ray, Kegley, and Puchala 1998; Geis and Wagner 2011;
Gowa 2011). Other critics point to liberal peace scholars’
narrow focus on interstate war, which ignores democratic
civil wars and liberal democracies’ covert actions against
other democratic regimes (Barkawi and Laffey 1999; Cohen
1994; Kegley andHermann 1996, 2001). In other words, crit-
ics argue that liberal theorists’ operationalization of their
independent variable (what counts as a liberal democracy)
and their narrow understandings of what counts as war de-
termine their findings. Yet, for all this conceptual scrutiny,
critical scholars have not closely examined what liberal
peace theorists mean by violence.
Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature (2012)
illustrates how liberal peace scholars fail to theorize vio-
lence. Contrary to what the book’s subtitle, “a history of vio-
lence and humanity,” suggests, the book does not offer any
definition of violence. In response to the question “[h]ow
do you define violence?” on the FAQ section of his personal
website, Pinker (2017) offers the following answer:
I don’t. I use the term in its standard sense, more or
less the one you’d find in a dictionary (such as The
American Heritage Dictionary Fifth Edition: “Behavior or
treatment in which physical force is exerted for the
purpose of causing damage or injury.”) In particu-
lar, I focus on violence against sentient beings: homi-
cide, assault, rape, robbery, and kidnapping, whether
committed by individuals, groups, or institutions. Vi-
olence by institutions naturally includes war, geno-
6Liberal peace researchers investigate the claim that liberal democracies
rarely, if ever, go to war with each other (Doyle 1983; Russett, Antholis, Em-
ber, et al. 1993; Oneal et al. 1996; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Owen
1994; Hermann and Kegley 1995; Ellis, Mitchell, and Prins 2010; Mitchell 2002;
Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi 2008; Kadera, Crescenzi, and Shannon 2003).
Many researchers use battlefield deaths as a proxy for violence to empirically
test this claim. Oneal and Russett offer the strongest version of this thesis, assert-
ing that the interlocking of liberal institutions led to a global decline in violence
(Oneal and Russett 2001). Some liberals explore the links between international
trade and interstate peace (Gartzke 2007; McDonald 2009, 2010; Mousseau 2009;
Weede 1995) and the role of international institutions such as the United Na-
tions in preventing wars and keeping peace between states (Boehmer, Gartzke,
and Nordstrom 2004; Dorussen and Ward 2008; Kinne 2013; Mack 2008, 85;
Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998; Wilson, Davis, and Murdie 2016). Scholars note
the absence of violence since the end of the Cold War (Mack 2008; Pinker 2012,
chap. 6) or defend the role of the liberal international legal order in reduc-
ing global armed conflict (Hathaway and Shapiro 2017; Hathaway and Shapiro
2018; Kumm, Havercroft, Dunoff, et al. 2017; Owen 1994; Rodrigues 2017;
Sapiano 2017; Corradetti 2017; Sweet and Palmer 2017). For a recent critique
see Geis (2018).
cide, corporal and capital punishment, and deliberate
famines.
After noting just one of the three possible definitions in
that dictionary, Pinker narrows his focus to physical force.7
He explicitly discounts economic inequality as violence and
criticizes other understandings of violence as metaphorical
(Pinker 2017).
Realist, behaviorist, and rational choice researchers usu-
ally understand violence as death or lethal force. Many
employ concepts such as deterrence and compellence to
describe violence and view violence as a tool states wield
to achieve desired ends (Petersen 1986; Lebow and Stein
1990; Schelling 1990; Stein 1992). The ethics of war liter-
ature treats violence as perpetrated by one actor or sets
of actors against others, permitting a selective ascription
of moral value (Walzer 2006; Doyle and Macedo 2011;
Rengger 2013). Scholars of humanitarian intervention view
violence as a form of statecraft (Lang 2001; Wheeler 2003;
Finnemore 2005; Keohane 2010; Vincent 2015). Mark Neo-
cleous and scholars working within a radical Marxist tradi-
tion develop a subtle but critical inflection of this argument
(Neocleous 2010; Neocleous, Rigakos, and Wall 2013). Neo-
cleous and collaborators unsettle the distinction between
war and peace, focusing on the perpetuation of war in the
securitizing of peace. They draw attention to the direct vi-
olence of policing and counterinsurgency and its role in
sustaining pax. They also show how this type of violence en-
trenches what they call the “social war of capital” (Neocleous
2010, 9). These authors argue, as we do, that violence cre-
ates observable zones of pacification (compare Davenport
2004, 2007a, 2007b). However, unlike us (see footnote 10),
Neocleous and collaborators view direct violence as the pri-
mary instrument of pacification.
These parsimonious accounts have significant drawbacks.
Direct accounts of violence discount other kinds of harm
in the world as not violent. In doing so, these understand-
ings dismiss the possibility that invisible forms of violence
produce harm. Scholarly accounts of direct violence may
even conceal other forms of force, harm, and injury when
researchers limit their understandings of violence to acts of
physical harm that can be directly linked to agents. With this
in mind, we now turn to scholars who adopt structural and
indirect conceptions of violence.
Indirect Violence
Postpositivist, Marxist, post-structuralist, and feminist schol-
ars offer many theoretical and methodological ways to
understand indirect violence. Indirect violence refers to
the aggregate actions of social groups and institutions that
cause violence on other social groups. Indirect forms of
violence still “kill,” but do so “slowly and undramatically
from the point of view of direct violence” (Galtung and
Höivik 1971, 73). Scholars measure indirect violence by
examining “the number of avoidable deaths that occur,”
rather than via the proxy of battlefield deaths (and the
binary dead/alive) (Galtung and Höivik 1971, 73). For
example, researchers might compare the life expectancy
of someone in one country (say, Guinea) and someone
in another country (say, Sweden), or someone within the
7American Heritage Dictionary offers other definitions of violence including
the following: “a. Intense force or great power, as in natural phenomena: the
violence of a tornado. b. Extreme or powerful emotion or expression: the violence
of their tirades” and “Distortion of meaning or intent: do violence to a text.” See
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=violence, accessed June 2016.
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same country but hypothesized as living without structural
violence (Köhler and Alcock 1976). Whereas scholars of
direct violence assume one agent inflicts harm on another
agent, researchers who study indirect violence examine how
larger social groups, institutions, and processes inflict harm
in the aggregate and often unintentionally.
Postpositivist scholars also expand our understandings of
violence but rarely question the concept itself. Campbell
and Dillon (1993, 2) note the ontological character of vio-
lence; they focus on the “reasoning subject.” R. B. J. Walker
provides a list of multiple direct, metaphorical, and struc-
tural examples of violence. These “may be known under
many names: oppression, injustice, inequality, crime, pun-
ishment” and may be described by such historically con-
tingent terms as “alienation and commodification” and
through the technological “homogenizing” of human sub-
jectivities (Walker 1993, 139). Walker recounts the underly-
ing narrative of violence as a means to work “for its eradi-
cation” (ibid.). Yet, when it comes to international relations
(as opposed to capitalism), his commentary is limited: “In
the context of the state system, by contrast, violence is more
obviously violence” (Walker 1993, 139; compare Hirst 2013).
Scholars working within postpositivist traditions shed light
on the many multifaceted, insidious, and discursive forms
of violence, but they still conceive violence as discrete and
observable. In this way, critical understandings sit surpris-
ingly close to liberal assumptions.
Feminist scholars offer complex and deeply social un-
derstandings of violence, including studies of the effects of
patriarchy on social structures. Feminist approaches draw at-
tention to gender-based violence (Enloe 2014; Walby, Tow-
ers, and Francis 2014; Bjørnholt and Hjemdal 2018), the
ways perpetrators and victims are socially constituted, the
relationship of violence to the body, and how social con-
structions of gender make and remake our social orders.
However, feminist approaches to violence also focus on ob-
servable phenomena. Researchers draw attention to rape
as a strategy of war, for example, and point to continuities
between violence during times of war and peace (Enloe
2000; Hansen 2010; Kirby 2012; Inal 2013; Hirschauer
2014; Grove 2015; Meger 2016). Scholars scrutinize gen-
dered assumptions that men are the agents of violence and
“women and children” its objects (Enloe 2014, 25; Elshtain
1987; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007; Kinsella 2011; Sjoberg
2013; Tickner 2013). These norms shape who is protected
and who remains subject to “sexual violence, forced con-
scription, and sex-selective massacre” (Carpenter 2006a, 83;
2006b). In doing so, feminist scholars focus on how violence
is distributed, authorized, located, and embodied and de-
velop methodologies for studying these processes (Wibben
2016). Laura Shepherd argues that, whereas “violence is
conventionally conceived of as a functional mechanism,”
both violence and security can be understood by examin-
ing how “gendered violence . . . ‘marks and makes bodies’”
(Shepherd 2007, 240). Similarly, Lauren Wilcox employs
a gendered and structured understanding of violence to
methodologically ground her analysis of violence as embod-
ied. However, Wilcox’s study of embodied violence consid-
ers specific acts—torture, force-feeding, suicide-bombing,
and targeted killing via drones—that are identifiable and
observable (Wilcox 2015, 7; compare Scarry 1987; Richter-
Montpetit 2007). Each functions causally rather than inter-
subjectively.8
Neither direct nor indirect theorizations of violence fully
account for the pervasiveness of violence in the world. In
8We follow Charles Taylor’s (1971) definition of intersubjectivity (see below).
addition to direct and indirect violence, we propose a third
type of violence: pacification. We now turn to phenomenol-
ogy to uncover it.
Toward a Phenomenology of Violence
To illustrate the limits of direct and indirect accounts of vi-
olence, consider the following thought experiment. A man
enters a home with a gun, points the gun at the family, and
begins to make requests of the family. The family, intimi-
dated by the implied threat of the gun, complies. Is this in-
teraction violent? Most people would agree that, yes, it is.
The implied threat of force terrorizes the family. Yet, neither
direct nor indirect conceptions of violence adequately cap-
ture the violence of this scene. Any physical violence com-
mitted by the gunman is direct violence, and any causal,
lasting, yet largely unseen effects (such as a heart attack
induced later by the stress of attack) is indirect violence.
While direct and indirect violence both focus on measured
effects of violence, our point is more fundamental. We of-
fer a third conception of violence to make sense of such
scenes.
Acts of violence do not only inflict physical (and/or
psychological) harm, they also restructure the social and
political world. Imagine that the gunman in the thought
experiment attacked a white South African family who live
within a gated complex. The barbed wire crowning the com-
pound walls, the bars on all the doors and windows, and
the private security guard posted out front illustrate how
this family lives in constant fear of armed intruders. The
assailant might come from a family that suffered under
apartheid’s racialized social order. He might not have bene-
fited from society’s democratization and liberalization. If the
gunman scaled these walls and inflicted wounds—physical
or otherwise—everyone would agree violence had occurred.
But what if the barbed wire, barred windows, and private se-
curity guard successfully kept the would-be assailant at bay?
The family goes about its daily routine, but is the world
any less violent? Though the presence of walls and barbed
wire prevent observable violence in this scenario, we argue
that this society remains—in its lived, material, and psy-
chic forms—structured by violence. Violence constitutes the
worldhood.
Data showing that direct violence is on the decline ob-
scures the intensification of other forms of violence. Using
the graph below as an example, rapid and historically un-
precedented increases in economic inequality since 1970
have coincided with the pacification of militant political op-
position such as rioting, guerrilla warfare, and political as-
sassinations (see Figure 1).9 Rioting, guerrilla warfare, and
assassinations throughout the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury exposed increasing discontent with perceived systemic
injustice, including capitalism, patriarchy, imperialism, colo-
nialism, and white supremacy. Liberal society suppressed
these forms of violent political resistance over the past fifty
years (Murphy 2017). A restructuring of social relations dis-
placed and co-opted violent protests against the perceived
injustices of the world order. This restructuring represents a
third type of violence called pacification.10
9The contentious event counts are from the Cross-National Data Archive
(Banks and Wilson 2017), which is based on the New York Times reports. The in-
equality variable reflects the top decile income share (including capital gains) in
the United States (Piketty 2014).
10Our account of pacification differs from those of Neocleous (2010, 2011)
and Neocleous et al. (2013). We push beyond an account of violence and peace
as material or institutional forms of violence and toward an account of vio-
lence that encompasses a richer phenomenology. In their account, pacification
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Figure 1 Inequality and the pacification of militant contention in the US.
Notes: For legibility, event counts from Banks and Wilson (2017) were transformed into ten-year moving averages. These and
the inequality measure from Piketty (2014) were then scaled to ease comparison. Scaling was done by subtracting the mean
from each variable and dividing by one standard deviation; the lines reflect standard deviations from historical means (0).
The hallmark of pacification is that the structures of dom-
ination ensure that resistance in the form of direct violence
against this order is less frequent. There are numerous ways
that implicit and explicit threats, global surveillance, imbal-
ances in military power, displays of military might, occupa-
tions, blockades, nuclear deterrence, terrorism, and coun-
terterrorism, counterinsurgency, sanctions, trade disputes,
and embargoes, for example, restructure intersubjective re-
lationships in global politics. A focus solely on discrete acts
of physical harm and quantifiable events does not and can-
not capture the restructuring consequences of these acts.
Our account of violence hypothesizes that the restructuring
of social and political worlds might lead to fewer acts of di-
rect violence if the restructuring deters agents from engag-
ing in direct violence. The restructuring might also lead to
less quantifiable physical harm, direct or indirect. However,
this decrease may be achieved through an intensification of
pacification.
Our point is that pacification is the most difficult kind of
violence to observe and, if operating effectively, will corre-
late with the absence of direct violence. Pacification is diffi-
cult to observe because it is diffuse and involves the coercive
reordering of social relations. Phenomenology, with its focus
on background practices, structures, and the constitution of
social relations, provides a methodology for uncovering this
form of violence.
The first step in this theoretical development is to recog-
nize the intersubjective character of violence. The meaning-
ful structures of our world do not exist independently of us.
Our identities are in a coconstitutive relationship with our
society’s institutions, practices, shared meanings, and norms
(Taylor 1971, 27). A phenomenological account of violence
examines the ways that violence is not simply a thing. “The
expression ‘phenomenology’ signifies primarily a method-
ological conception,” able to uncover not just things them-
selves, but phenomena that are hidden yet are fundamental
operates through direct and indirect violence. In our account pacification is a
third kind of violence that makes instances of the first two kinds of violence less
likely.
to our being (Heidegger 1962, 59). These phenomena in-
clude different types of beings or entities, including struc-
tures, and how our being makes sense of and functions in
this world (Dreyfus 1991, 32).
Violence is one of the structures of our world and con-
tributes to our understanding and ability to function in
this world. There are, however, different worlds (Heidegger
1962, 93). Martin Heidegger offers a tripartite classification.
The first (1) is the world of physical objects. The second (2)
is a world of shared practices and shared beliefs. The third
(3), what Heidegger calls “worldhood,” is the ontological-
existential sense of the world (1962, 93). Direct violence op-
erates in the first world. Indirect violence operates in the
second world. Pacification as violence exists in this third
world (worldhood).
Within world three the ontological character of violence
is not that of an object, but is the structuring of the intersub-
jective relations of our being-in-the-world. Most of the time
we are able to function in our surroundings because of our
ability to cope with that which we encounter. We know how
to act in certain situations and what specific purpose specific
things serve. Sometimes, however, something breaks down
or malfunctions. In such situations, the object, relation, or
worldhood reveals itself (Heidegger 1962, 105). This reveal-
ing is when the inconspicuous becomes conspicuous. Vio-
lence functions as a moment of revealing.11 Overt acts of vi-
olence (direct or indirect) reveal elements of our world that
otherwise remain hidden. Violence brings out grievances
and animosities that are otherwise dormant, perhaps sim-
mering, waiting to be released; this is the case whether it is
to do violence to a text or to erupt physical violence in a
pub. Similarly, the violence of a riot is a visible expression
11While Heidegger’s phenomenology in Being and Time does not address ei-
ther politics or violence, Hannah Arendt’s (1970) work illuminates the political
implications of a phenomenological critique of violence. In her critique, violence
takes on similar characteristics as any other technology that breaks. However, the
type of breakdown that occurs through violence differs from Heidegger’s because
violence involves people’s interactions with each other (and not primarily with
other objects). Arendt’s treatment of violence rests on this distinction.
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of a worldhood characterized by unseen or ignored social
relations.
Our typology of violence distinguishes between direct, in-
direct, and pacification (see Figure 2). The typology distin-
guishes six different characteristics across the three types
of violence. Pacification operates through different modes
of power other than direct and indirect violence. Drawing
on Michael Barnett’s and Raymond Duvall (2005, 48) ty-
pology of power, direct violence corresponds to compul-
sory power, indirect violence to institutional and structural
power, and pacification to productive power and some el-
ements of structural power. Pacification as violence is in-
conspicuous. It pertains to our worldhood in a constitutive
fashion. It is intersubjective and it is diffuse. These charac-
teristics, taken together, identify pacification in ontological-
existential terms.
Researchers rarely, if ever, consider violence that falls un-
der the ontological-existential category. From this category,
what counts as violence within international relations schol-
arship is be understood instead as brief moments when the
largely invisible structuring of the world becomes visible: di-
rect violence is epiphenomenal. To rephrase Heidegger, di-
rect and indirect violence mark breakdowns that reveal part
of the world, but violence remains a part of this world that it
reveals.
Phenomenology, as we are using it, is not about lived ex-
perience. It is the philosophical tradition of revealing dif-
ferent types of beings and things that contain meaning in
our world, the structures and/or contexts in which they ex-
ist, and how these structures and contexts are meaningful.
Understood in this way, violence is one of these structures
and/or contexts. A phenomenological perspective does not
approach violence from a particular normative position,
although it does not preclude normative critique. A phe-
nomenological approach does not treat violence as a dis-
crete thing that one agent does to another, although it does
not preclude such acts being described as violent. Instead, a
phenomenological perspective adds to our intellectual and
methodological toolbox by identifying violence as a condi-
tion or context in which people function. Phenomenology
allows us to identify violence occurring in ways and in places
that we otherwise would not be able to recognize. It does not
change the meaning of violence (as harm, for example). In-
stead, it treats violence ontologically, enabling us to reveal
more accurately the extent to which violence exists in the
world.
From a phenomenological perspective, violence is often
inconspicuous. Violence can function as a naturalized or
internalized regime of compulsion or domination. Pacifica-
tion reveals both the pervasiveness of violence and forms
of violence that may otherwise remain inconspicuous. The
erasing of tradition and the enforcement of particular legal
codes at the expense of indigenous cultural norms is one
example of an inconspicuous form of violence that involves
conspicuous and inconspicous consequences (Cocks 2014).
In understanding violence phenomenologically, as a struc-
ture of revealing across multiple worlds, we are better able
to reveal the extent to which violence shapes our world and
how we are then shaped by violence.
Pacavere
The Romans understood violence as a necessary condition
for pax. The liberal imagination blinds itself to the ways that
pacification functions as violence in our world order. In-
ternational relations scholarship’s strict distinction between
peace and violence reinforces this obfuscation. Yet, the vio-
lence of (and in) pacification is central to the contemporary
world. A phenomenological approach shows that moments
of violent rupture are not aberrations of the world order.
Violent outbreaks are breakdowns of pacification. It follows
that multiple structures of the world order function as the
violence of pacification, of pacavere.12 These structures in-
clude liberal capitalism, colonialism and the postcolonial af-
termath, and war. Each functions as a key site of pacification.
Anarchist thought reveals the pacification in liberal capital-
ism. Postcolonial thought reveals the pacification of colonial
projects. Both anarchist and postcolonial thought demon-
strate how war is a breakdown of pacification, revealing the
hidden violent structures of our worldhood.
Anarchist critiques of capitalism, unlike Marxist and lib-
eral interpretations, take seriously the decisive role of state
violence in structuring society and markets. Anarchists view
the state as an institution that sustains elite appropriations
of political and economic power (Proudhon [1861] 1998;
Sorel 1999; Prichard 2015). Those at the bottom of the so-
cial hierarchy bear the costs of this enforced order. The
state diffuses violence (pacification) throughout the entire
society—often in ways that go unrecognized by its subjects
(Sorel 1999, 65). The naturalization of violence consoli-
dates arbitrary regimes of domination in society. While spe-
cific, countable incidents of violence may decline, the so-
cial order is largely premised on the threat of violence
for contravening social norms making specific, countable
incidents of violence relatively rare (Kinna and Prichard,
forthcoming).
Anarchist thinkers view rising inequality in the context
of declining riots, insurgencies, and assassinations (see
Figure 1) as evidence of pacification. Incidents of proletar-
ian violence, anticolonial violence, riots, and protests are all
examples of resistance to the “regimes of domination” that
shape contemporary society, regimes easily identifiable by
those subject to them (Gordon 2007, 33). Drawing on these
accounts, we interpret declining rates of riots as a sign of
increased pacification, rather than evidence that the system
is becoming less violent. Conversely, eruptions of antistate
and anticapitalist direct violence are signs of a breakdown
in pacification. Much like Heidegger’s example of broken
equipment (1962, 102–3, 412–13), which draws our atten-
tion to the background structures of our world, brief in-
stances of direct violence reveal violently structured social
relations.
Although the liberal imagination obscures the centrality
of violence, violence has always been central to the liberal
world order—to the liberal worldhood—particularly dur-
ing the colonial and imperial projects of the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries (Bell 2007a, 2007b). Colonial vio-
lence was diffused throughout the entire society, often in
ways that went unrecognized by the colonized themselves.
The violence of pacification structured the very existence of
the colonized subject. This violence transformed the colo-
nized subjects into a different “species” (Fanon 1963, 35–
40, 43). Colonial pacification was more than direct and in-
direct violence; it was sufficiently diffuse to remake the psy-
che of the colonized, affecting their mental health and emo-
tions (Fanon 1963, 35–106). Fanon (1963, 31) described it
as “atmospheric violence,” a “violence rippling under the
skin.” Unable to lash out against the colonizer, the colonized
lived everyday within a world ordered by violence. In this
world, the colonized could not respond to the colonizers
for fear of directly violent reprisals and would turn to sym-
bolic activities such as a dance circle to expose the violence
12Pacavere is a conjugation of paco.
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Figure 2. Typology of violence
experienced on a daily basis (Fanon 1963, 57). For the colo-
nized, rituals such as the dance were a means of expressing
existential frustrations with and resistance to the violence
of colonial pacification through reenactments of direct vi-
olence. Ultimately, anticolonial struggles exposed the vio-
lence of colonialism by directing that violence back on its
authors.
Practices of colonial rule were central to developing lib-
eral norms of sovereignty, as well as to the domination
and control of recalcitrant populations whether within Eu-
rope, such as the English domination of the Welsh, Irish,
and Scots, or outside of Europe by settler colonialists
against indigenous populations (Deloria Jr 1974; Anghie
2005; Miller 2006; Havercroft 2008; Shaw 2008; Barkawi
and Stanski 2012; Coulthard 2014; Simpson 2014; Lightfoot
2016; Rueda-Saiz 2017). This civilizing imagination func-
tioned phenomenologically. It produced insiders as civi-
lized and peaceful and outsiders as violent, external threats
to civilization. In doing so, this imagination successfully
obscured how the structures of liberalism produced colonial
violence.13
13Arguments about the foundational role of colonialism, primitive accumula-
tion, and white supremacy in structuring the modern international system are
particularly useful in thinking about phenomenological violence (Jones 2006;
Anievas, Manchanda, and Shilliam 2015; Du Bois 1915; Shaw 2008; Coulthard
2014; Deloria 1974; Lowe 2015; Hartman 1997). The legacy of these practices per-
vades contemporary liberal peace-building (Richmond 2014; Sabaratnam 2015;
Bouka 2013; Autesserre 2009) and liberal global governance (Koomen 2014a,
2014b, 2013), while trade liberalization can facilitate mass violence (Kamola 2007;
Smith 2016). Césaire argues that colonialism produced a “boomerang effect”
within European societies; Nazism was the return of violence previously “applied
only to non-European peoples” (Césaire 2000, 36). At independence, interna-
tional law became a mechanism for reinforcing this international order upon the
previously colonized world (Grovogui 1996).
The idea of war as an external practice of states, not tied
to their internal workings and located according to specific
normative projections of Western identity, followed from
this colonial mentality. This mentality legitimized the ex-
porting of violence to create a Western imperial pax and was
so widespread that it shaped the development of modern
warfare (Ellis 1986; Proudhon [1861] 1998). The colonial
wars reproduced and reinforced ideologies of Western su-
periority, evidenced in part by the West’s superior military
technology. A consequence of this racist hubris was the in-
ability to foresee the destructive tendencies of Western war-
fare when unleashed against themselves (Ellis 1986).
The discipline of international relations, founded in re-
sponse to the unexpectedly destructive character of the First
World War, reproduced this understanding of war.14 This
understanding disguises the possibility of increasing vio-
lence within the liberal world by presuming a historical nar-
rative of progress and being shocked by its aberration. War,
however, is not the absence of peace or an aberration of lib-
eral progress, but is instead a phenomenological breaking
of the liberal worldhood.15
Once a liberal order of democracy, free markets, and in-
ternational institutions are spread throughout the world,
14 See Agathangelou and Ling (2004), Vitalis (2017), Nayak and Selbin
(2013), and Koomen (2018). On different origin stories of international relations
and their consequences, see Baron (2014, 226–28).
15Our concept of liberal pacification is not the same as “positive peace.” Paul
Diehl argues that rather than focusing on the negative peace—such as, “the ab-
sence of war”—scholars should also study “broader conceptions of peace,” namely
those that include “considerations of justice, human rights, and other aspects of
human security” (Diehl 2016, 9; Goertz, Diehl, and Balas 2016). Using the terms
of our analysis, however, such arguments simply call upon scholars accustomed to
studying peace as an absence of direct violence to expand their analyses to study how
liberal institutions can find solutions to indirect violence as well. Phenomenolog-
ical violence remains absent in these accounts.
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liberal ideology imagines peace as the end state. Yet, states
often deploy war under liberal guises.16 Wars under the
aegis of humanitarian values and regime change are ex-
amples of the multifaceted character of liberal pacifica-
tion. Liberal regimes emphasize the violence of those
that they are invading, while minimizing the violence in-
volved in these military undertakings and the violence
necessary to sustain the liberal societies themselves. What
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon called “the moral phenomenol-
ogy of war” (Prichard 2015, 112–34; Proudhon [1861]
1998) becomes an integral part of the everyday work-
ings of society that shape innumerable aspects of our
daily language. The upshot is that, within liberal ide-
ology, the violence committed by liberal states is justi-
fied, whereas the violence committed by illiberal states
is not.
Postcolonial and anarchist scholarship focuses on the in-
corporation of violence in the production of liberal spaces
(Barkawi and Laffey 1999). These same concerns can be
directed onto the liberal order itself. Seen from the per-
spective of marginalized and oppressed populations, the
structures of liberal pacification take on a distinctly vio-
lent aspect. The liberal world is not less violent. Rather,
the liberal world involves a sophisticated phenomenological
process of legitimating certain types of violence in order to
render other types of violence invisible.
Liberal Pacification
What does it mean to apply this third type of violence to
our understanding of international relations? Pacification
reveals liberalism as a violent process as opposed to a system
that is emblematic of the absence of direct violence. There
are parallels between the Pax Britannia, Pax Americana, and
the ancient peace of the Pax Romana (Neocleous 2010, 13).
However, our account emphasizes the crucial role of pacifi-
cation as a distinct kind of violence in maintaining these pa-
cific orders. Our theory offers the novel insight that incor-
porating pacification into the analysis of the liberal peace
reveals crucial aspects of this peace that conventional and
critical accounts neglect.
A focus on pacification provides three critical insights.
First, it recovers the crucial role of pacification in the his-
torical founding of the liberal order. Second, by distinguish-
ing between three kinds of violence (Figure 2), we account
for the empirical observations of the liberal peace as lead-
ing to a decline in direct violence and an increase in vio-
lence overall as part of the pacification of the Pax Americana.
Conversely, the liberal version of the Pax Americana cannot
account for key anomalies. Third, our approach draws atten-
tion to the violent ordering of social relations. This dimen-
sion of violence is neglected even in Marxist, postcolonial,
neo-Gramscian, and post-structuralist critiques of the liberal
peace, which primarily focus on the role of direct and indi-
rect violence in maintaining the Pax Americana.
Contemporary liberal international relations theory em-
phasizes the nonviolent role of the liberal triad (democ-
racy, free markets, and institutions) in causing the liberal
peace. Yet, a quick review of the history of liberalism in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries shows that key figures in
liberalism, from John Stuart Mill, to Joseph Galliéni, to
American foreign policy elites, understood pacification as
a necessary step in establishing and maintaining the liberal
order.
16 See Abu-Lughod (2015), Coker (1998, 2010, 2007), Dillon and Reid (2009),
Evans (2011), Howard (2008), and Neocleous (2010, 2013, 2011).
Mill, one of the philosophical founders of liberalism, con-
ceptualized and deployed liberalism as a domination strat-
egy. Mill argued that it is appropriate to impose despotism
or slavery on “savages” who incline to “fighting and rapine,”
but the government should use force as little as possible:
What they require is not a government of force, but
one of guidance. Being, however, in too low a state to
yield to the guidance of any but those to whom they
look up as the possessors of force, the sort of govern-
ment fittest for them is one [that] possesses force, but
seldom uses it. (Mill 1998, 232–33)
In terms of our conceptual distinction, Mill argued that
liberalism as pacification was a more effective instrument of
violence than the direct modes of violence that governments
usually deploy.
The history of European colonialism is replete with this
line of reasoning. “[L]iberal improvement” was a regular
plank of colonial strategy by France and Britain in the nine-
teenth century (Owens 2015, 154). Consider one example
from the French colonial tradition. Galliéni, a military com-
mander and administrator, consciously deployed liberalism
as a domination strategy in the pacification of Tonkin dur-
ing the 1890s. Galliéni’s strategy involved slowly spreading
military outposts and deploying civil administrators to cre-
ate markets, schools, and amenities. The rationale was that
locals would gain a personal interest in the continuation
of French control and would help to quell Chinese brig-
andage. “Piracy,” said Galliéni, “is the result of an economic
condition. It can be fought by prosperity” (quoted in Owens
2015, 157). Galliéni devised a “theory of pacification” in
which “the correct combination of force and politics can so-
cialize, pacify, and domesticate a population into regulating
itself” (quoted in Owens 2015, 157). What Mill proposed in
theory, Galliéni enacted in practice; pacification—the vio-
lent reordering of social relations in a colony—was a more
effective means of maintaining liberal rule than the deploy-
ment of direct violence.
While less explicit, the relationship between liberalism
and imperialism remained present in the twentieth-century
development of the Pax Americana. During this era, US pol-
icy makers sought to construct a zone of peace distinct from
the zones of war associated with authoritarian regimes. The
US State Department first recognized the concept of “hege-
monic pacification” in the Euro-Atlantic conference diplo-
macy of the 1920s (Cohrs 2008, 619). The United States’
“strategic restraint” in the aftermath of World War Two was
motivated by this concept of liberal, hegemonic pacification
(Ikenberry 2009; Ikenberry 2011, 173). US defense officials
Stimson, Patterson, McCloy, and Assistant Secretary Howard
C. Peterson agreed that it was a matter of the security in-
terests of the United States to maintain “open markets, un-
hindered access to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of
much—if not all—of Eurasia along liberal capitalist lines”
(Leffler 1984, 349–56; Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Liberalism
as a domination and pacifying strategy continued through-
out (and long after) the Cold War (Laffey 2003; Stokes
2003), as evident in one of the founding documents of the
post–World War Two liberal order, NSC-68 (Ikenberry 2011,
168). While the enforcement of a Pax Americana eventually
yielded a decline in direct violence, it produced an increase
in other types of violence. The first insight of our theory is
that pacification has always been part of the liberal project
and that the violence in the liberal project never went away.
The second insight is that by reinterpreting the liberal
peace as liberal pacification we are able to grant the
empirical findings of liberal peace theorists while
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maintaining that the Pax Americana represents an in-
tensification of violence overall. In the language of positivist
social science, our theory is observationally equivalent to
that of liberal peace theory. We expect that the quantity
of direct violence inversely associates with the degree of
pacification in a society. Therefore, our interpretation
challenges research that identifies liberal institutions as the
cause of declining violence. Liberal institutions, as appa-
ratuses of liberal pacification, ensure that direct violence
is increasingly rare while leaving the structures of violence
and domination in place. The observational equivalence
on particular dependent variables (in our case, all forms of
direct violence) produces a theoretical change requiring
the generation of novel observable implications (King,
Keohane, and Verba 1994, 30).
Furthermore, increased suffering in liberal societies pro-
vides evidence contradicting the main claims of liberal
peace theories, while remaining consistent with liberal paci-
fication. At its core, liberalism is a project that tries to
maximize the utility of its subjects (in other words, mini-
mize suffering while maximizing happiness). As such, a state
of liberal peace should lead to a decrease in markers of
suffering. However, there is more slavery in the world to-
day than ever before, with conservative estimates of between
12.3 and 27 million people in debt bondage, chattel, or con-
tract slavery (Gordon 2012).17 Moreover, there is ample evi-
dence of rising psychological disorders in liberal societies. A
preponderance of evidence from the United States suggests
that depression, anxiety, alienation, opioid dependency,
stress, other related psychological disorders, increased so-
cial isolation, and the decline of community have increased
throughout the twentieth century (Twenge, Zhang, and Im
2004, 320; Adler, Boyce, Chesney, et al. 1994; Twenge 2000;
Twenge, Konrath, Foster, et al. 2008; Twenge, Gentile, De-
Wall, et al. 2010; Cohen and Janicki-Deverts 2012; American
Society of AddictionMedicine 2016). Changes to human life
associated with modernity have caused psychological stress
to increase (Jackson 2014). Mortality rates have increased
for some white, non-Hispanics aged 45–54 in the United
States between 1999 and 2013 (Case and Deaton 2015).
Modern technological advances from television to the In-
ternet may contribute to increasing separation and alien-
ation of the social human animal into individualized bodies
connected by increasingly weak and empty bonds (Putnam
2000; Gray 2011; Turkle 2011). At minimum, new informa-
tion communication technology such as Facebook can in-
crease the stress and anxiety of its users (Lee-Won, Herzog,
and Park 2015). The violent structuring of liberalism en-
ables increases in social alienation, anxiety, stress, and hu-
man bondage through repression, economic control, and
social isolation.
17Much of the research we cite here is based on data from the United States,
mirroring the US-centric liberal peace literature. As a paradigmatic liberal mar-
ket economy, the United States should be a most-likely case for the expectation
of generally decreasing violence. John Owen, for example, argues that it is not
coincidental that the “discourse and practice” of the democratic peace thesis was
developed in the United States, given that American social scientists are greatly
informed by the country’s “strong liberal tradition” (2011, 162). For an overview
of the Eurocentric assumptions embedded within critiques of the liberal peace,
see Sabaratnam (2013). Anomalous observations from the United States should
raise doubts about other countries around the world. There is evidence that such
trends likely generalize across liberal societies. For example, Ferrari, Charlson,
Norman, et al. (2013) have calculated that depression is a significant and growing
cause of shortened lifespans and death around the world, including within many
liberal societies. With respect to the pacification of violence, we note that rioting
has decreased as a share of street-protest activity (relative to peaceful demonstra-
tions) since the 1970s in most continents around the world (Murphy 2017). These
data suggest that these dynamics are unlikely to be peculiar to the United States.
These are not isolated instances of suffering. They are
fundamental structural features of our liberal world. If lib-
eralism is a process of pacification rather than simply peace,
then this rise in individual suffering in liberal spaces may be
evidence of a similar process that Fanon equated with the
psychic life of the colonist. Just as Fanon’s colonial subjects,
unable to lash out at the settler through direct violence, in-
ternalized their suffering, modern liberal subjects, unable to
resist liberal pacification, internalize their suffering (1982,
chap. 6; cf. Sorel 1999, 118). Liberal peace should bring
about a rise in happiness; that it has instead led to rising
suffering is evidence of liberal pacification.
Third, in addition to offering an alternative interpreta-
tion of the liberal peace, our theory of liberal pacifica-
tion supplements key insights from critical approaches to
peace. Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey’s work on impe-
rial processes and liberal spaces makes a similar point to
ours, that the celebrated zone of liberal peace rests on
practices of violence (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 2002; cf.
Neocleous et al. 2013). Their account, however, focuses on
practices of direct violence, such as humanitarian interven-
tions against authoritarian regimes or corporations hiring
local militias to make work sites in the global south safe
for economic extraction (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 422).
Our point is that these moments of direct violence lead to
pacification wherein social relations have been so violently
reordered as to make direct violence no longer necessary.
Once direct violence has established liberal space, pacifi-
cation functions as a structure of violence that sustains the
space. Direct violence only manifests itself when pacification
weakens.
Pacification, however, does not merely operate through
manipulating the conscience of its subjects. While Marx-
ist and Gramscian concepts of ideology and hegemony are
consistent with our theory of pacification (Peceny 1997,
418), they do not address how the constructed political
order sustains itself through a violent reordering of so-
cial relations. A Gramscian-inspired critique of the demo-
cratic peace can yield a bird’s-eye view of the ways in
which liberal peace theory is itself deployed as an ideolog-
ical tool (Ish-Shalom 2006, 569–75). However, Gramscian-
inspired approaches do not account for the ways that
everyday practices of violence (for example, surveillance
technologies, implied threats from weapons, security barri-
ers, etc.) sustain liberal pacification. While ideational fac-
tors are important in pacification, these factors rest upon
practices and structures that are of an ontological-existential
character.
To review, our reinterpretation of the liberal peace as
liberal pacification offers three novel insights. First, liberal
scholars and others associate the development of the liberal
order with peace and a decline in violence by ignoring how
pacification is part of the liberal project. Second, the empir-
ically observed decline in violence equated with the liberal
peace is not necessarily a sign of human progress but could
be a sign of intensified repression or increases in other
forms of suffering across the liberal world order. Third, our
concept of pacification reveals violence that is neither direct
nor indirect but is phenomenologically structured into the
world order. Understanding liberalism as pacification pro-
duces a paradigm shift. Liberal pacification is violent in the
sense that it coerces a specific type of liberal docility, while
also preventing types of resistance that might be understood
as violent, including riots, insurrections, civil wars, and inter-
state wars. Pacification reveals the ongoing violence at the
heart of a political project that imagines itself to be against
violence.
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Conclusion
Our account of pacification recovers a crucial aspect of pax,
one originally etched into Romanmonuments. The heading
of the Res Gestae (the funeral monument to Emperor Augus-
tus) reads, “[t]his is how he [Augustus] made the world sub-
ject to the power of the people of Rome” (Beard 2016, 364).
This monument does not celebrate peace as the absence of
violence; it celebrates pacification. Pax takes the form of a
process that violently reorders the world so that imperial
subjects are rendered incapable of using violence to resist
Roman rule. The absence of overt acts of violence depends
upon the maximization of pacification.
The practice of pacification includes threats, coercion, in-
timidation, and surveillance to restructure and sustain social
and political relations. When this type of violence operates
effectively, it appears as the absence of violence; pacifica-
tion’s violence resides in the structuring of the prevailing or-
der. While such an outcome may appear peaceful, it entails,
at best, a negative peace that operates through a violent and
coercive reordering of society.
Liberal peace advocates measure direct violence and
equate the decline in that kind of violence with peace.
However, our claim is that the spread of liberal institutions
does not necessarily decrease violence but transforms it.
Our phenomenological analysis captures empirical trends
in human domination and suffering that liberal peace the-
ories fail to account for, including increased inequality, slav-
ery, anxiety, addiction, and anomie. Our analysis also high-
lights how a decline in direct violence may actually coin-
cide with the transformation of violence in ways that are
concealed, monopolized, and structured into the fabric of
modern liberal society. If our theory is correct, we will
find increases in markers of suffering as society liberalizes.
While we cannot say whether these indicators are unique
to pacified liberal societies, it is significant that they are
rarely, if ever, discussed in terms of violence and the liberal
peace.
Liberal pacification is observationally equivalent to liberal
peace. This is not a semantic argument. Liberal peace ad-
vocates claim that processes that promote individual free-
dom and autonomy (that is, democracy, free markets, and
global institutions) cause peace. While the restructuring of
the global order—pacification—reduces direct violence, it
also restructures social relations in ways that are violent. De-
clines in directly observable violence render other forms
of violence invisible as violence; in fact, insidious, coercive,
and violent systems of military deterrence and compellence,
nuclear terror, surveillance, and intimidation constitute the
worldhood of the liberal order.
Supplementary Information
Supplementary information is available at bit.ly/Baron-et-
al-ISQ-data and at the International Studies Quarterly data
archive.
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